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Abstract 
 
In the current study we examined the effect of having the opportunity to plan an alibi 
in advance on the suitability of the verifiability approach in two crime scenarios that 
differed in their opportunity to carry out innocent activities at the time of the crime. 
One hundred and two participants imagined being involved in stealing money either 
from a café at a time when it was open (allows innocent activities) or from a bank at a 
time when it was closed (does not allow innocent activities). We asked participants 
about their strategies and difficulties in preparing a verifiable alibi in advance, and to 
write down their prepared alibis. The participants in both groups found this task 
difficult and did not differ in the difficulties they experienced, however they differed 
in their strategies (plans to include true witnesses) and actual success in the task. 
Participants in the Café scenario provided 30% more verifiable details than the 
participants in the Bank scenario. Strategies and difficulties mentioned by the 
participants are presented in the paper, and the implications of the study's results on 
the application of the verifiability approach are discussed.  
2 
 
Can someone fabricate verifiable details when planning in advance? 
It all depends on the crime scenario 
Suppose someone is planning to commit a crime. Obviously, the person will 
try to avoid getting caught, but may also be aware of the possibility that the police 
will suspect him or her at some point. Since a convincing alibi can save the person 
from prosecution, it is better for the person to think about a potential alibi at a very 
early stage, already before or while committing the crime. Is it possible for a criminal 
to plan in advance a convincing alibi? We examined this question in the present paper.
 According to the Reality Monitoring approach (RM; Alonso-Quecuty, 1992), a 
truthful alibi is expected to be clear and to include many perceptual details (e.g., 
descriptions of what someone saw, heard, smelled etc.), emotional details (e.g., how 
the person felt) and contextual details (e.g., where and when the described activities 
took place) (Vrij, 2008). Recently, Nahari, Vrij and Fisher (2014a) introduced the 
verifiability approach, which emphasizes the ability to verify these contextual and 
perceptual details provided in the alibi rather than assessing their mere presence. 
Central to the verifiability approach are two assumptions. First, research has shown 
that the richer in detail an account is perceived to be, the more likely it is to be 
believed (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Johnson, 2006; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 
1988).  Liars seem to be aware of this assumption and are inclined to provide many 
details in order to make an honest impression on observers (see Nahari, Vrij, & 
Fisher, 2012). Second, liars prefer to avoid mentioning too many details out of fear 
that investigators can check such details and will discover that they are lying (Masip 
&  Herrero, 2013; Nahari et al., 2012). Those two assumptions reflect contradicting 
motivations for liars which put them in a dilemma. On the one hand, they are 
motivated to report many details to make an honest impression, and on the other hand 
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they are motivated to avoid providing details to minimise the chances of being caught. 
A strategy that compromises between these two conflicting motivations is to provide 
details that cannot be verified. That is, when attempting to make an honest 
impression, liars may choose to provide details that are difficult to verify (e.g., ‘I saw 
a black Audi driving in Shenkin Street’) and avoid providing details that are easy to 
verify (e.g., ‘I phoned my friend Fred at 10.30 this morning’). Consequently, as 
Nahari, Vrij, and Fisher (2014a; 2014b) showed, liars tend to report fewer verifiable 
details than truth tellers.  
Nahari et al. (2014b) further showed that informing interviewees just before 
they provide their statements about the interviewer’s intention to check for verifiable 
details in their alibis increased the ability to distinguish between truth tellers and liars. 
While informed truth tellers included more verifiable details into their accounts than 
the uninformed truth tellers, no difference emerged between informed and uninformed 
liars, presumably because informed liars did not have such details to provide. As a 
result, the difference in including verifiable details between truth tellers and liars was 
more pronounced in the informed participants than in the uninformed participants. 
Yet, the participants in Nahari et al. (2014b)'s study were informed regarding the 
interviewer’s intention to check for verifiable details only after they had carried out 
their crime. Therefore, a still unanswered question is what would happen if liars were 
made aware earlier about the interviewer’s intention to check their details - before or 
at the time when they carry out their criminal activity. In the current study we aimed 
to provide an answer to this question.  
One strategy that liars may apply is to carry out verifiable innocent activities at 
the same time as carrying out their criminal activities. Nahari et al. (2014b) observed 
such a strategy when some liars carried out criminal activities (e.g., copying a stolen 
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exam in the library) but pretended that they carried out a non-criminal activity (e.g., 
copying an article in the library). They were therefore able to report true verifiable 
details, such as real conversations they had in the library or paying by credit card for 
the copies. However, in this study liars could report such a false account relatively 
easy, because their presence in the library when the crime was committed was 
legitimate. It may be much more difficult for liars to apply such a strategy in 
situations where their presence at the crime scene at a specific time is not legitimate 
(e.g., being in the library after closing time). In the current study, we manipulated the 
crime scenario making it legitimate or illegitimate for the suspect to be at the crime 
scene at the time the crime occurred, and examined the impact of this manipulation on 
suspects’ strategies and the kind of details they provide. 
The current study  
 The current study was designed to examine the suitability of the verifiability 
approach for cases where criminals have an opportunity to plan their alibies in 
advance. We introduced two crime scenarios. The participants were asked to imagine 
being involved in stealing money either from a café at a time when the café was open 
or from a bank at a time when the bank was closed. The Café scenario allows 
criminals to admit being present at the café when the crime took place, and, 
consequently, gives them the opportunity to carry out truthful verifiable activities. In 
such cases criminals can provide true witnesses (i.e., people they actually met in the 
café during or around the time the crime took place and can report these truthful 
interactions in their testimony). The Bank scenario does not allow criminals to admit 
being present at the bank at the time the crime was committed and, consequently, 
provides them with less opportunity to come up with truthful verifiable activities. In 
such a case, criminals who wish to provide verifiable details have to fabricate these 
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details. For example, they can provide circumstantial evidence. That is, evidence that 
can imply that a claimed fact is truthful, but which cannot be proven to be truthful 
(e.g, a cinema ticket provided as proof for an alibi is circumstantial physical evidence, 
because having a ticket does not prove that the suspect actually was in the cinema at 
the time of the crime). They can also provide false witnesses to back up their alibi 
(e,g., to ask a friend to tell the police that they were together).  
Our aim was twofold: to (i) learn about the steps and strategies criminals may 
take to prepare in advance a verifiable alibi; and (ii) compare the two scenarios in 
terms of strategies used by the mock criminals and the amount of verifiable details 
provided in their alibi statements. These insights are important for the application of 
the verifiability approach in real life.  
Our hypotheses were as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Participants in the Café scenario condition will plan to include more 
true witnesses in their accounts than participants in the Bank scenario condition. In 
contrast, participants in the Bank scenario condition will plan to use more fabricated 
details (false witnesses and circumstantial evidence [e.g., a receipt, phone calls, 
emails]) than participants in the Café scenario condition.    
Hypothesis 2: Participants in the Bank scenario condition will find it more difficult to 
prepare a verifiable alibi than participants in the Café scenario. 
Hypothesis 3: The percentage of participants in the Café scenario condition that will 
position themselves in the café will be higher than the percentage of participants in 
the Bank scenario condition that will position themselves in the bank.  
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Hypothesis 4: Participants in the Café scenario condition will provide more verifiable 
details than participants in the Bank scenario condition. 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 102 students (72 females and 30 males) participated in the 
experiment for course credits or payment of 30 Israeli shekels (about $9). Their mean 
age was 23.49 years (SD = 4.26 years).   
Procedure 
 Participants arrived at the laboratory individually or in small groups (up to 
four participants) at a predetermined time. The experimenter told them that the 
experiment dealt with examining the efficiency of certain lie detection tools. All 
participants signed a consent form indicating that participation was voluntary and that 
they could withdraw from the experiment at any time without penalty. Participants 
were then assigned randomly to one of two experimental conditions in which we 
systematically varied the crime scenarios (Bank, Café). In this way, 51 students (36 
female and 15 males) were participated in each crime scenario condition.   
Crime scenarios 
We designed two scenarios – Bank and Café - that were similar in their crime 
features, such as type of crime (stealing money), duration of the event (about 45 
minutes) and time of the day (Wednesday at 13:15). We referred to a specific Bank 
and a specific Café which are both located at the campus, so the participants (all 
students) are familiar with both of them. Since the Bank and the Café are close to each 
other, their surroundings are also similar. 
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Participants in the Bank scenario read the following instructions: "Imagine that 
you are planning to rob the Campus branch of Mizrahi bank next week. You prefer to 
do it when the bank is closed so that there are no customers. You prepare yourself by 
observing the activities at the bank from a nearby bench. You discovered that on 
Wednesdays the bank is closed between 13:30 and 16:00. During this break only one 
bank employee stays in the bank. You decide that between 13:30 and 16:00 is the best 
time to rob the bank. You also had to find a way to break into the bank. While 
observing the activities at the bank, you noticed that the manager leaves through the 
back door 15 minutes after the other workers leave the bank. The back door locks 
automatically after him, but since the door is heavy, the closing time is relatively long 
and takes about five seconds. This leaves you with an opportunity to enter the bank. 
Your plan is finalized. You are going to arrive at the bank next Wednesday at 13:15 to 
commit the crime. You expect to be at the bank for about 45 minutes." 
 The participants in the Café scenario condition received the following 
instructions: "Imagine that you are going to steal money from Greg café next week. 
You prefer to do it when customers are in the café. You prepare yourself by visiting 
the café to observe the activities in the café. You discovered that on Wednesdays the 
shifts change at 13:30. Just before that time the shift manager counts the money in the 
cash till, while the other workers continue serving the customers. After finishing 
counting the money the manager takes the money to his office in a special bag. He 
stays in his office with the money until the bank opening time (16:00), when he goes 
to the bank to deposit the money. You decide that the period between 13:30 and 16:00 
is the best time to steal the money from the café. You also had to find a way to break 
into the shift manager’s office. While observing the activities in the café, you noticed 
that the shift manager regularly stands by the window in his office to smoke a 
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cigarette. While he smokes, he stands with his back to the table on which the bag with 
money is. The shift manager’s office is located next to the café toilets. Since the shift 
manager never closes his office door whilst he is in his office, it leaves you with an 
opportunity to enter his office and take the money. Your plan is complete. You will 
arrive at the café next Wednesday at 13:15 to commit the crime. You expect to be at 
the café for about 45 minutes." 
Pre-crime stage 
After reading the crime scenario instructions, the participants in both 
conditions read the following instructions: "You have to take into account that you 
may be caught by the police after having committed this crime. The police may 
interrogate you and ask you to provide an alibi. Usually, the police check the 
verifiability of alibis, that is, an investigator determines the extent to which a suspect 
provides details which veracity status can be checked. If the suspect provides many 
verifiable details the police may believe that his/her alibi is truthful. On the other 
hand, if the suspect does not provide enough verifiable details, the police may think 
that the suspect provides a false alibi." And subsequently participants were asked 
three questions regarding planning an alibi in advance: (a) What steps can you take in 
advance (before or while committing the crime) to prepare yourself for providing a 
verifiable alibi in case you will be questioned by the police after having committed 
the crime?; (b) Please specify what the difficulties are (if any) in preparing in advance 
(before or while committing the crime) such a verifiable alibi?; and (c) Please rate on 
a 7-point scale (1 – not at all to 7 – completely) to what extent you find it difficult to 
prepare in advance (before or while committing the crime) a verifiable alibi?   
Post-crime stage 
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The participants were then told: "Let us imagine that you committed the crime 
successfully. The police suspect that you committed the crime, and want to interrogate 
you. They ask you to write a statement and to describe in as much detail as possible 
what you did on that Wednesday between 13:00 to 14:00. You know that, among 
others things, they will check the verifiability of the alibi you provide." The 
participants were first asked whether they were going to develop a strategy to appear 
convincing in their alibi. Participants who answered the question positively were 
asked to describe their strategy. 
 The participants were then asked to write down a statement. The specific 
instructions were: "The police ask you to provide a detailed statement about your 
activities on Wednesday between 13:00 and 14:00 (the time you committed the 
crime). They ask you to be as detailed as possible, so that they can understand exactly 
what you did at that period of time. A lie detection expert will check the statement 
you write.. She will check your statement in terms of verifiability, and the more 
verifiable detail your statement contains, the more likely it is that she will find your 
statement convincing. She may also actually check (some of) the detail you provide. If 
she found your statement convincing, you will receive your payment and be allowed 
to leave. In addition, you will participate in a draw in which four participants will win 
50 Israeli shekels (about $14) each. If the expert found your statement unconvincing, 
you will be asked to write a second statement about what happened and you will not 
participate in the draw. 
Participants' feedback post interview   
 After writing their statements, participants were asked to complete a post-
interview questionnaire and to mark their own statement. Participants were told that 
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the experiment had ended, that their answers would not influence the assessment of 
their statements as false or true, and that they were requested to answer the questions 
truthfully. They were asked to rate on 7-point scales (1 – not at all to 7 – completely): 
(i) To what extent were you motivated to appear convincing in your statement?, (ii) 
To what extent did you find it difficult to appear convincing in your statement?, (iii) 
To what extent did you find it difficult to provide verifiable details in your alibi?  
 (iv) To what extent did you think you were convincing in your statement?, (v) To 
what extent do you think your statement is verifiable (vi) What do you think is the 
likelihood that you will participate in the draw?, (vii)What do you think is the 
likelihood that you have to write an additional second statement? We combined 
questions ii and iii (perceived difficulty to succeed in the task, Cronbach alpha = .86), 
and questions iv, v, vi and vii (perceived success in the task, Cronbach alpha = .78).  
After the participants completed the questionnaire, they were debriefed and 
given their course credits. None of the participants were asked to write a second 
statement and all participants were included in the draw. 
Coding the Verifiability of the Statements 
All statements were rated by two independent coders (blind to the 
experimental conditions) who were asked to mark on the statements all the perceptual 
details (information about what the examinee saw, heard, or smelt during their alleged 
activities); spatial details (information about locations or the spatial arrangement of 
people and/or objects); and temporal details (information about when the event 
happened or an explicit description of a sequence of events) that potentially could be 
verified. Specifically, similar to Nahari et al. (2014a; 2014b), verifiable details were 
activities that were (i) documented and therefore checkable (examples are provided 
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below), or (ii) carried out together with (an)other identified person(s) (rather than 
alone or with a stranger who could not easily be traced), or (iii) witnessed by 
(an)other identified person(s). We counted as verifiable details only descriptions of 
actions that occurred (a) on Wednesday between 13:00 and 14:00, or (b) before or 
after this period of time, but at a location far enough away from the crime scene to 
rule out any possibility of the participant being at the crime scene between 13:00 and 
14:00 (e.g., a participant who claimed to have withdrawn money at 12.15 from a bank 
located at a two hours driving distance from the crime scene, could not have been at 
the crime scene between 13.00 and 14.00).  
For each participant we calculated the total number of details (perceptual, 
spatial and temporal) that could be verified. The ICC for coders was high and 
satisfactory: ICC = .89, p< .001. For example, they counted as verifiable details 
encounters or conversations with identified people; and documented activities such as 
withdrawal of money, phone calls, sending text messages or emails, and using credit 
cards. We calculated the average of the two coders' counts and labelled this variable 
‘number of verifiable details'.  
Coding the open-ended questions’ responses  
A research assistant read the participants’ responses and came up for each 
question with categories to classify them (these categories are described later in the 
Results section). Subsequently, two independent trained coders used these categories 
to classify the participant's responses. One coder classified all participants’ responses 
into these categories (Coder 1), while a second coder (Coder 2) classified 25% of the 
participants’ responses into these categories. The percentage of agreement between 
the two coders in the classification of the responses into the categories was high 
(83%), and indicated a sufficient inter- coder reliability.   
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Results 
Pre-crime stage 
Preparations and plans in advance for providing a verifiable alibi 
The participants were asked to specify what steps they can take in advance to 
prepare themselves for providing a verifiable alibi in case the police will question 
them after having committed the crime. The answers given by more than 10% of the 
participants (both conditions combined) were: 
Circumstantial evidence:  Forty eight participants (47.1%) planned to mention 
evidence such as receipts or credit cards payments, public transport tickets, 
cinema tickets, receipts of money withdrawals, phone calls, emails, informing 
others (by a phone call or text) where they are, signature on a university class 
attendance list etc.  
True alibi witness: Thirty six participants (35.3%) planned to mention people they 
are really going to meet during or around the relevant period of time as alibi 
witnesses. Thus these witnesses would be able to testify about truthful activities. 
Those witnesses could be strangers to the participant (e.g., salesman/saleswoman, 
people in the street that can be traced) or people known to the participant (e.g., 
friends, family members).  
False alibi witness: Thirty two participants (31.4%) planned to ask a third party to 
cover up for them by pretending that they were together, at a different location, at 
the time the crime took place. Those witnesses would only be able to give a false 
testimony.  
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"Frame" alibi: Fourteen participants (13.7%) planned to be with other people 
before and after committing the crime, in a way that the others will believe that 
they were with them all this time. For example, visiting the cinema with friends, 
leaving without anyone noticing, committing the crime, and returning to the 
cinema before the end of the movie.  
To test Hypothesis 1, we compared the frequency of the 'true alibi witness' and 
'circumstantial evidence' strategies in the two conditions. As expected, twice as many 
participants in the Café scenario condition (n = 24; 47.1%) than in the Bank scenario 
condition (n = 12; 23.5%) planned to have a true witness present, χ2(1) = 6.18, phi = 
.25, p< .05. However, the circumstantial evidence (n = 24; 47.1% in each group) and 
false witness strategies (n = 14; 27.5% in the Café scenario and n = 18; 35.3% in the 
Bank scenario) were not mentioned more frequently by participants in the Bank 
scenario condition than by participants in the Café scenario condition, χ2(1) = .00 and  
χ2(1)  = .73, ns, respectively. No differences between the groups were found for the 
frame alibi (n = 7; 13.7% in each group) either, χ2 (1) = .00, ns. 
Difficulties in preparing a verifiable alibi in advance 
In contrast to Hypothesis 2, the participants in the Café and in the Bank 
scenario did not differ in the extent to which they reported to find it difficult to 
prepare in advance a verifiable alibi, t(100) = 1.22, ns. Both groups rated the difficulty 
level as relatively high (M = 5.55 out of 7, SD = 1.14 for the Bank scenario and M = 
5.24 out of 7, SD = 1.33 for the Café scenario). When asked to specify these 
difficulties, all except three participants reported at least one difficulty. The two 
groups did not differ in the frequency of mentioning these difficulties, all χ2s < 3.02, 
14 
 
ns, and the answers given by more than 10% of the participants (both conditions 
combined) are presented in Table 1.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Post-crime stage 
Suspect presence in the crime area 
 We examined whether participants described activities in which they 
positioned themselves at the crime scene at the time the crime took place. While a 
small minority (n = 4; 7.8%) of participants in the Bank scenario condition reported 
activities that took place in the bank (e.g., claiming that they did not know that the 
bank was closed and entering the bank when the manager left), almost forty percent of 
the participants in the Café scenario condition (n = 20; 39.2%) reported activities that 
took place in the café, χ2(1) = 13.95, phi = .37, p< .001. This supported Hypothesis 3.  
 All the participants who positioned themselves in the Café at the time of the 
crime, except one, attempted to provide evidence that eliminated the possibility of 
being in the Café manager’s office (from where the money was stolen). The four 
participants, who positioned themselves inside the Bank provided 'innocent' reasons 
for their presence there. For example, one participant planned to pretend that she did 
not know that the bank is closed, and innocently followed the manager into the bank.     
Number of verifiable details 
We conducted a t-test with the number of verifiable details as dependent 
variable, and Group as factor. In accordance with Hypothesis 4, participants in the 
Bank scenario condition reported fewer verifiable details (M = 9.05, SD = 8.80) than 
15 
 
participants in the Café scenario condition (M = 12.81, SD = 10.14), t(100) = 2.00, 
Cohen's d = .40, p < .05.   
Post interview responses  
Motivation 
The reported motivation of the participants to be convincing in the statement 
was high (M = 6.26, SD = .96 on a 7-point Likert scale). There was no difference 
between the two groups in motivation scores, t(100) = 1.34, ns.  
Perception of difficulty and success in being convincing 
Participants found it relatively difficult to appear convincing in their 
statements (M = 4.62, SD =1.67), and assessed their success of being convincing (M = 
4.77, SD = 1.19) = 1.62) at a medium-high level. No difference emerged between the 
groups in any of these measurements, all ts(100) < 1, ns.  
Discussion 
 In the present experiment we compared two crime scenarios which differed in 
their opportunity to embed truthful facts into a false account. We examined mock 
criminals' strategies and difficulties in preparing a verifiable alibi in advance, and the 
number of verifiable details they provided in their statements.  
 In the Café scenario the presence of the suspect in the café at the time of the 
crime was legitimate (because the crime took place when the café was open), whereas 
in the Bank scenario the presence of the suspect in the bank raised suspicion (because 
the crime took place when the bank was closed). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
40% of the participants in the Café scenario positioned themselves in the café at the 
time of the crime, while only 8% of the participants in the Bank scenario positioned 
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themselves in the bank. Positioning themselves in the café, allowed participants in the 
Café scenario to report truthful and verifiable non-criminal activities they carried out 
in the Café at the time of crimei, and more so than the participants in the Bank 
scenario. Indeed, participants in the Café scenario provided 30% more verifiable 
details than participants in the Bank scenario.  
One may wonder why 60% of the participant in the Café scenario did not use 
the legitimacy of presenting in the Café at the time of the crime, in order to provide an 
embedded lie. One possible explanation is that positioning themselves in the Café is a 
risky strategy, as being close to the crime scene increased their ability to commit the 
crime and thus weakened their defence claim. All participants –except one- who 
positioned themselves in the Café at the time of the crime, tried to provide evidence 
showing that they could not be in the manager’s office (crime scene). Of course, from 
a liar’s perspective, it remains to be seen how convincing this sounds.    
Avoiding to position themselves in the crime scene nicely fits with the ‘avoid 
and escape’ strategy, often used by guilty suspects (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; 
Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Doering, 2010). That is, in accordance with the 
concept of 'aversive conditioning' (see….), guilty suspects try to avoid or terminate an 
aversive stimulus. Specifically, when they have the opportunity to do so, guilty 
suspects avoid mentioning information that may incriminate them in order to prevent 
confrontation with the threaten stimuli (i.e., avoidance response). When they do not 
have the opportunity to simply avoid the incriminating information (e.g., when they 
are confronted with specific evidence), they may choose to determine the threatening 
stimuli by denying or contradicting the incriminating knowledge (i.e., escape 
response). In the current study, the participants provided their accounts in response to 
an open, general question (a free recall phase). Thus, participants in the Café scenario 
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condition had the opportunity to apply an avoidance response, and many of them used 
this opportunity and avoid mentioning that they were in the Café at the time the crime 
occurred. Obviously, those participants who applied the avoidance response took 
another risk – that the the interviewer had an evidence that they were present in the 
Café (e.g., CCTV records). This would make their entire alibi questionable and would 
damage their credibility. 
The participants in the current study were encouraged to provide verifiable 
details. This might have encouraged the participants in the Café scenario condition to 
located themselves in the Café, as it is easier to provide true verifiable details when 
admitting presence in the Café than when denying it.. The design of the current study 
does not allow us to test how participants who are not encouraged to provide 
verifiable details would behave. This is a question for future studies.  
 Surprisingly, the groups did not differ in their perception of the task. Both 
groups thought it to be rather difficult to prepare in advance and to provide a 
verifiable alibi.  This finding contradicted our expectations, and shows that even when 
a scenario creates the opportunity to report embedded lies, and even when the 
interviewee had the opportunity to plan an alibi in advance, providing a convincing 
statement was still perceived as difficult. Yet, although they found the task difficult, 
participants in both groups felt they succeed to overcome the difficulties, and believed 
they provided a reasonably convincing statement. This perception  may be wrong, as 
we know from previous studies testing the verifiability approach (e.g.,  Nahari, et al. 
2014b), that truth tellers are typically more convincing than liars and include more 
verifiable details into their accounts. It happens because (a) they don’t have (b) they 
try to avoid…   
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 When asked about steps they can take in advance to prepare a verifiable alibi, 
in accordance with our expectations, twice as many participants in the Café scenario 
compared to the Bank scenario planned to report a true witness, probably because the 
Café scenario provides a better opportunity to do so. Contrary to our expectations, a 
similar percentage in both groups planned to create circumstantial evidence and to 
report false witnesses. It seems, therefore, that although participants in the Café 
scenario could use more easily true witnesses, this did not decrease their motivation to 
create circumstantial evidence and to report false witnesses, perhaps in an attempt to 
boost the number of verifiable details in their accounts.   
The participants were told to imagine that they were suspects in committing a 
crime, but they were not told what the reason for this suspicion was. It is reasonable to 
assume that participants' account will differ depending on what they think the reason 
for this suspicion is. For example, telling the participant that someone saw them near 
the crime scene may lead them to admit that they were at the crime scene (especially 
if their presence there is legitimate), no matter what their plans were in advance. In 
fact, what we did in this study is not fundamentally different from what is proposed in 
the Strategic Use of Evidence literature, to delay presenting evidence to suspects 
(Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Vrij, 2005). We know from that literature that liars tend to position themselves away 
from the crime scene (as many participants in our study did), which creates evidence-
statement inconsistencies in liars if subsequently evidence is presented that 
demonstrates that they were at the crime scene (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015).  
 The current study has several limitations worth mentioning. First, the 
participants were asked to imagine the crime act rather than committing a mock 
crime. In a mock crime, participants perceptually experience events. While being 
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present in the café, they may meet people, overhear conversations, and may witness 
events and interactions. This may allow them to provide more verifiable details than 
our participants, who only imagined that they were in the café, could provide. 
Consequently, it is possible that the tendency of participants who positioned 
themselves in the café to provide verifiable details is stronger in real-life than it was in 
our study. Since this limitation is relevant to the Café scenario only, one may expect 
that the difference in verifiable details provided between these two scenarios will be 
greater in real life than in our study.  
 Second, all participants in the current study were guilty. This means that we 
could not directly test the efficiency of the verifiability approach in distinguishing 
between truth tellers and liars in the examined scenarios.  Such a test may be 
considered in future research.  
 Third, we used written statements in the current experiment. Written 
statements have been used before in deception research in general (e.g., Nahari, Vrij, 
Fisher, 2012; Sporer & Sharman, 2006) and in verifiability approach studies in 
particular (Nahari, et al, 2014a, 2014b; Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Nahari, Vrij, Leal, 
Warmelink, & Vernham, in press). In addition, other methods such as SCAN also use 
written statements and SCAN is popular amongst practitioners. However, one may 
argue that writing a statement is an easier task for a liar than providing an oral 
statement, because it gives more opportunity to consider what detail to provide. Thus, 
we expect that the task would be more difficult for the participants in both groups 
when they have to produce oral statements, a speculative assumption that has to be 
tested empirically in future research.  
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 To conclude, adding verifiable details is a difficult task for liars, even when 
they have an opportunity to plan the crime and the alibi in advance. When the 
scenario allows a criminal to carry out innocent activities at the time of the crime, 
criminals who plan in advance may include more truthful verifiable details in their 
accounts than when the scenario does not allow them to do so. We suggest keeping 
the type of scenario in mind when applying the verifiability approach.   
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Table 1: Difficulties to prepare in advance a verifiable alibi 
Find a witness Thirty participants (29.4%) reported that they would find it difficult to find a 
witness. The participants indicated this difficulty regarding both false and true 
witnesses. The main difficulty regarding false witnesses was to convince them to 
cooperate, while the main difficulty regarding true witnesses was how to meet 
them at the time of the crime without raising suspicion among those witnesses. 
Trust a witness Thirty participants (29.4%) reported that they were concerned that the true or 
false witness will start to regret helping out the suspect and will not cooperate, 
will break down during a possible interrogation or will contradict the suspect’s 
story or evidence. Participants also indicated that relying on another person 
would make them feel uncomfortable. 
Timing Twenty three participants (22.5%) indicated that it may be difficult to create 
verifiable details at the relevant time framing. For example, the time that appears 
on a receipt must be the time that the crime took place, and this is difficult to 
achieve. 
Creation of 
evidence 
Twenty participants (19.6%) mentioned difficulty in executing their plans. For 
example, a male participant who planned to claim being at the cinema raised the 
difficulty of collecting the cinema tickets just before the movie starts (because he 
has to commit the crime at this time), and thus needs a collaborator who will 
collect the tickets for him.  
Prediction and 
control 
Nineteen participants (18.6%) wrote that it is difficult to predict in advance what 
would happen because it is impossible to control all details and events. For 
example, hidden cameras, unexpected appearance of someone, and delays in 
executing some activities, may all hamper the execution of the planned activities. 
Reliable alibi Sixteen participants (15.7%) reported to find it difficult to provide a statement 
that is plausible and difficult to refute. They were concerned to contradict 
themselves, to forget details of their planned false alibi, etc. 
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i The number of verifiable details provided by participants in the Café scenario was higher for 
participants who positioned themselves in the café (M = 15.58, SD = 12.93) than for participants who 
did not positioned themselves in the café (M = 11.03, SD = 7.55), with a medium effect size (Cohen's d 
= .45). However, presumably because of low statistical power in this test, the difference between these 
groups was not significant, t(49) = 1.59,  p = .12. 
